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ABSTRACT 
Most prominent accounts of autonomy are active accounts, which means they hold that an agent 
can be autonomous with respect to a given action only if that agent has appropriately sanctioned 
that action. Active accounts, however, are vulnerable to the regress problem, since it seems that 
the required sanctioning actions are themselves just actions that must be sanctioned. Passive 
accounts hope to avoid the regress problem by eschewing the notion that autonomous action 
requires agential sanction, but face in its place what I call the incompleteness problem for passive 
accounts. Here, I evaluate one passive account, recently defended by Sarah Buss, and argue that 
it can avoid the incompleteness problem only if it is supplemented by a satisfactory account of 
the development of autonomy. I then suggest that one development account, offered by 
Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan Cuypers, is an especially good supplement. My conclusion is that 
Buss’s account, supplemented in the way I suggest, can avoid the incompleteness problem.  
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1 Introduction: Autonomy, Active and Passive 
Suppose that Smith, faced with a choice between action A and action B, chooses A. To 
say that Smith did so autonomously presupposes at least two things about him. First, that Smith 
was in control of himself when he chose A; Smith had a certain set of motivational pro-attitudes 
(MPAs) – beliefs, desires, principles, etc. – and acted in accordance with those MPAs. Second, 
that the set of MPAs that guided Smith’s choice to perform action A were his to begin with; that 
is, his MPAs were not the result of, for instance, hypnotic suggestion or some other form of 
psychological manipulation. Accounts of personal autonomy, then, have at least two goals: to 
explain when an agent is in control of his actions, and also to explain when an agent himself is in 
control of his actions. The current inquiry will focus primarily on the latter goal. 
What, then, makes it the case that the MPAs that guided Smith’s decision were his 
MPAs? Most accounts of autonomy hold that the relevant set of MPAs would be Smith’s only if 
he directly sanctioned or endorsed it, perhaps by reflecting on it and deciding whether or not to 
accept it. Call accounts that require agential sanction active accounts. Active accounts are 
problematic, however, because they seem to make autonomy impossible for us to attain. After 
all, if we suppose that an action is autonomous only if it were, say, reflectively endorsed, then it 
would also be true that the endorsement, which is itself an action, must be sanctioned. And there 
seems to be no way to terminate the impending regress.  
This regress problem has motivated thinkers like Sarah Buss (2012) to reject this 
requirement of active accounts – that autonomous actions require agential sanction – and accept 
instead a passive account of autonomy, according to which it isn’t necessary for Smith to do 
anything in order for his decision to perform A to be considered his decision. This isn’t to say 
that agential sanction is not an important part of what it means to be an autonomous agent. It is 
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merely to say that insofar as Smith himself plays the decisive role in determining his actions, he 
does so in a way that cannot be adequately described by recourse to agential sanction. What this 
entails, though, is that the onus is on the proponents of passive accounts to explain how it is 
possible for agents to act autonomously without having sanctioned their actions or the MPAs that 
guide them.  
In this essay, I will offer a defense of passive accounts of autonomy. In particular, I will 
argue that Buss’s passive account, based on what she calls the human flourishing condition, 
succeeds in providing the relevant explanation, but only if it is supplemented with an explanation 
of how autonomy develops in the first place.  
The essay will proceed as follows. In Section II, I will review the motivations for passive 
accounts in more detail, and make the nature of the problem that they face more explicit. In 
Section III, I will present Buss’s account, and suggest a way in which her account could be 
supplemented, namely, by assimilating a satisfactory account of the development of autonomy. 
In Section IV, I discuss one development account, put forward by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan 
Cuypers (2007), and argue that it helps Buss’s account avoid the problem that I outline in 
Section II. Finally, in Section V, I conclude the essay. 
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2 Motivating the Passive Account 
To a first approximation, autonomy is the ability of agents to govern themselves 
according to some set of MPAs that are their own. Most attempts to analyze autonomy in this 
sense fall into one of two broad categories: structural or historical. Structural accounts of 
autonomy hold that an agent is autonomous with respect to an action just in case the set of MPAs 
that led to the performance of that action is appropriately arranged. One classic example of the 
structural account comes from Harry Frankfurt (1971), who argues that autonomy requires acting 
on a first-order desire (e.g., a desire that X) that is both endorsed by a second-order desire (e.g., a 
desire to desire that X) and actualized by a second-order volition (e.g., a desire to be moved by 
the relevant second-order desire regarding X).1 
Historical accounts, on the other hand, hold that an agent is autonomous with respect to 
an action just in case that action was endorsed by the right kind of historical process. Mikhail 
Valdman (2011), for example, argues that an agent is autonomous with respect to an action just 
in case that agent has engaged with the MPAs that motivate it, where engagement entails “a 
process of deliberation whose purpose is to determine whether a desire is worth maintaining and 
worth acting on” (423). 
It is important to note that ‘historical’ in this context does not refer to the simple passage 
of time. Rather, it connotes a special kind of causal participation by an agent in the production of 
her actions. A historical process, then, will be one by which an agent establishes the appropriate 
kind of causal relationship between herself and the production of her actions, regardless of how 
much time actually passes as the relevant causal relationship is established. Usually, this process 
                                                 
1
 Of course, Frankfurt wrote this essay as a contribution to the free will debate, rather than to the debate about 
personal autonomy. However, Frankfurt’s account is often presented within the personal autonomy debate as a 
paradigm example of the structural account. My inclusion of Frankfurt’s account here reflects that convention. 
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includes not the mere having of a desire, but a decision to have a desire that is arrived at by 
deliberative and self-evaluative processes. 
Structural and historical accounts have obvious differences, but are united in their 
commitment to the idea that autonomous actions require agential sanction of some sort, either in 
the form of taking the appropriate attitudes or performing the appropriate actions. We can 
represent this idea as a commitment to the following principle: 
Activity Principle (AP): an agent is autonomous with respect to an action only if the agent 
appropriately sanctions that action. 
 
As we’ve seen, structural accounts cash out ‘appropriately’ in terms of suitably arranged sets of 
MPAs, while historical accounts do so in terms of the completion of historical processes. 
However, since both kinds of account accept AP in some sense or other, I will henceforth and 
freely refer to them as active accounts. 
One problem with active accounts is that they seem to make autonomy impossible to 
attain. To see this, consider again Frankfurt’s structural account, according to which an action is 
performed autonomously only if it was, among other things, actualized by a second-order 
volition. The required second-order volition is itself a desire (about another desire, of course, but 
a desire all the same), and it is unclear why it shouldn’t have to be endorsed in just the same way 
that first-order desires do. We could call upon third-order desires or volitions, but the same sort 
of questions would arise. Why should we stop there? Why should it be the case that third-order 
MPAs can confer autonomy while second-order MPAs cannot? Without a principled answer to 
questions like these, there seems to be no good reason for terminating the regress at any 
particular point. And, so the objection goes, the fact that there is no reason to terminate the 
regress at any particular point is conclusive reason to reject the account that set the regress in 
motion.   
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A similar problem afflicts historical accounts of autonomy. Consider again Valdman’s 
account, which involves a process of deliberation about one’s MPAs, the purpose of which is to 
inform a decision about whether those MPAs are worth maintaining or acting on. The required 
deliberation, as well as the decision informed by that deliberation, are themselves just actions 
that can only be performed autonomously if they were preceded by the appropriate process of 
deliberative endorsement (and the same goes for this pre-endorsement endorsement). And again, 
there seems to be no principled reason to terminate the regress at any particular point in the 
agent’s personal history and, as such, no reason to think that any particular instance of 
endorsement has more authority than any other. 
Upon closer inspection, then, active accounts seem to require either, in the case of 
structural accounts, an infinite number of MPAs, or, in the case of historical accounts, an 
infinitely long personal history. Of course, it is unclear whether actually having infinitely many 
MPAs or infinitely long histories would actually help to terminate the regress, since we would 
still be without good reason for terminating it at any particular point. What should be clear, 
however, is that since we are finite beings, unable in any case to enjoy the benefits of such 
infinite resources, active accounts seem to set the bar for autonomous action far beyond our 
reach. Active accounts, then, united in their acceptance of AP, invite what is known as the 
regress problem. 
The susceptibility of active accounts to the regress problem is the main motivation for 
passive accounts of autonomy, which holds that agents need not do anything at all to make it the 
case that they themselves produce their actions. That is, passive accounts reject the claim that 
agential sanction is necessary for autonomous action (though they can, but need not, allow that it 
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is sufficient). By rejecting AP, passive accounts hope to avoid the troublesome regress problem 
altogether.  
There is, however, a potential problem with passive accounts, which is that of having to 
explain just how autonomy is possible without the characteristic sanctioning requirements of 
active accounts. Active accounts, despite being problematic, are at least intuitive; it is very 
reasonable to suppose that an agent governs himself only to the extent to which he endorses or 
sanctions his actions. In order to counter this intuition, passive accounts need to do more than 
simply object to the active approach to autonomy. Without a positive account of what autonomy 
requires if not agential sanction, it would be unclear why we should shift away from the intuitive 
active approach in favor of passive accounts, as opposed to simply attempting to repair or adjust 
the active approach (or, for that matter, to adopt a skeptical attitude regarding human autonomy). 
In short, without such a positive account of the requirements of autonomy, passive accounts, 
despite being amply motivated, are toothless. Call this the incompleteness problem for passive 
accounts, or just the incompleteness problem.  
In the next section, I will discuss one passive account, recently defended by Sarah Buss 
(2012), and suggest a solution to the incompleteness problem. The key to a solution, I will argue, 
lies in having available a satisfactory account of how autonomy develops in normal human 
beings.  
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3 Buss on Manipulation 
In this section, I aim to show that Buss’s passive account is incomplete in the way that 
I’ve just described, though it provides important foundations for an effective passive account of 
autonomy that I will begin to develop in the following section. I will now provide some 
background on Buss’s account in order to facilitate that discussion. 
3.1 The Human Flourishing Condition 
Buss’s account is motivated partly by the aforementioned concerns about the 
vulnerability of active accounts to the regress problem. But her account is also motivated by 
what she sees as an important though almost entirely overlooked connection between the 
concepts of autonomy and human flourishing. We can approximate the nature of this connection 
by considering that some psycho-physiological conditions manage intuitively to undermine our 
autonomy, even when we deliberate carefully about our actions.  
Consider Mary, for instance, who is my normally kind and pleasant coworker. Mary 
usually greets me in the morning politely and happily. On this particular day however, Mary 
could hardly be said to have “greeted” me at all; she responded to my ‘hello’ tersely and with a 
rude remark. What should I make of Mary’s terse and rude remark? Suppose I think to myself: 
something must be wrong with Mary, she doesn’t usually act like this.  
This is a reasonable response. But insofar as I mean to be offering an excuse for her 
behavior, I can’t mean simply that she acted out of character. After all, the simple fact that Mary 
acted uncharacteristically does not, by itself, indicate that she didn’t do so autonomously. No, if I 
mean ‘Mary doesn’t usually act like this’ as an excuse for her behavior, I must be pointing to 
something else about Mary, some deeper fact about her that does the work of explaining away 
her behavior. 
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As a proponent of the passive account, Buss rejects the idea that this deeper fact relates to 
the manner in which Mary exercised her agency in that instance. Rather, according to Buss, the 
deeper fact to which we draw attention when we say ‘Mary doesn’t usually act like this’ is that 
whatever caused her to act uncharacteristically did so in a way that was external to, or 
independent of, Mary’s own influence on her behavior. 
Presumably, then, certain psycho-physiological conditions can constitute external 
influences on our behavior even when they are, in one obvious sense, internal (i.e., bodily) 
influences. In what sense, then, do those conditions operate externally to our own influence? 
Buss writes: 
To be a human agent is to be a representative member of a species. This means that there 
is an important respect in which even well-integrated, long-standing psychological and 
physiological conditions are external to a human agent’s identity insofar as they are 
causes or symptoms of human malfunctioning. And this means that there is an important 
sense in which when such conditions exercise a decisive causal influence on the 
formation of someone’s intentions, she does not produce her own actions – no matter 
how carefully she reviews her options and no matter how wholeheartedly she endorses 
her response to these options. 
(Buss 2012: 660) 
 
Some psycho-physiological conditions, then, are either causes or constituents of human 
malfunctioning, and operate externally to our influence over our behavior for just this reason. 
But what does it mean for a particular psycho-physiological condition to be a cause or 
constituent of human malfunctioning? Buss has something like the following in mind. We, as 
human beings, are a particular kind of creature with a particular way of functioning well. We 
have basic human needs, psycho-physiological in nature, the satisfaction of which enables us to 
live minimally decent lives. A psycho-physiological condition is a cause or constituent of human 
malfunctioning when and to the extent that it prevents its bearer from satisfying one or more of 
these basic needs.  
9 
This is an important move for Buss’s account, as it grounds a normative distinction 
between sick and healthy human beings that, Buss argues, is inseparable from the distinction 
between autonomous and nonautonomous human beings. In one straightforward sense, sick 
human beings are no less human than healthy ones; all human beings, sick or healthy, are 
members of the same species. However, if Buss is right, then sick human beings, despite being 
no less human, are less perfect representatives of the species than their healthy counterparts; 
since their basic human needs aren’t met, they fail to function minimally well as human beings 
and, as such, are prevented from expressing their identity as healthy human beings. And it is in 
this sense that psycho-physiological conditions, when they constitute causes or symptoms of 
human malfunctioning, operate externally to the influence of their bearers; they prevent, rather 
than facilitate, their minimal well-functioning as human beings. 
Now, not all causes or symptoms of human malfunctioning undermine autonomy. Such 
conditions might prevent someone from being perfect representatives of the human species 
without thereby undermining her control over her behavior. It is quite possible, for instance, to 
imagine people with striking health issues – for example, amputees, blind people, and those with 
terminal but well-managed diseases – who nonetheless manage to have decent lives and to act 
autonomously in doing so. It is only when such conditions do manage to play a decisive role in 
determining one’s behavior that they undermine autonomy. Thus, we arrive at the following 
principle, which serves as the basis for Buss’s passive account of autonomy: 
Human Flourishing Condition (HFC): [A] human being fails to act autonomously if and 
only if she forms her intentions under the decisive […] influence of conditions that are 
elements or symptoms of human malfunctioning. 
(Buss 2012: 660) 
 
One might worry that ‘human flourishing condition’ is a misleading name for this principle, 
since it runs the risk of obscuring the purported relationship between human well-functioning, 
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human flourishing, and personal autonomy. On Buss’s account, it is not human flourishing that is 
required for autonomy; indeed, to require that a human agent flourish as a human being before 
that agent could be considered autonomous would be to set the bar for autonomy far too high. 
Rather, it is minimal human well-functioning that is required for autonomy, and autonomy in 
turn is but one constituent of human flourishing. Perhaps, then, a better name for this principle is 
the ‘human functioning condition’, since its satisfaction requires only that the agent functions 
minimally well qua human being. However, for the sake of consistency, I will continue to refer 
to this principle as the ‘human flourishing condition’.  
The HFC is Buss’s way of overcoming the incompleteness problem that I set out in the 
opening. That is, the HFC describes how it is that agents manage to act autonomously without 
having to rely on agential sanction; agents control their actions autonomously when they do so in 
ways that aren’t detrimental to their minimal well-functioning as a human being. There are many 
interesting facets of the HFC that, for lack of space, I will not be able to discuss here.2 The 
remaining discussion will focus solely on how Buss makes use of the HFC in responding to a 
kind of counterexample that has been very difficult for autonomy theorists to overcome.  
3.2 Buss’s Passive Treatment of Manipulation 
For the remainder of this section, I will evaluate Buss’s response to manipulation cases – 
cases wherein an agent who shows the outward (and even inward) signs of acting autonomously 
is, nonetheless, nonautonomous – and argue that she still has more work to do in providing a 
complete account of the passive requirements for autonomy. Consider now the following 
manipulation case, which I will refer to as Ann/Beth: 
                                                 
2
 One might wonder, for example, exactly how to fill out the list of basic human goods that might bear on the 
question of whether any agent at any particular time satisfies the HFC. For one compelling attempt to complete such 
a list, see Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge, 
2000). 
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Ann is an autonomous agent and an exceptionally industrious philosopher. She puts in 
twelve solid hours a day, seven days a week; and she enjoys almost every minute of it. 
Beth, an equally talented colleague, values a great many things above philosophy, for 
reasons that she refined and endorsed on the basis of careful critical reflection over many 
years. She identifies with an enjoys her own way of life – one which, she is confident, has 
a breadth, depth, and richness that long days in the office would destroy. Their dean (who 
will remain nameless) wants Beth to be like Ann. Normal modes of persuasion having 
failed, he decides to circumvent Beth’s agency. Without the knowledge of either 
philosopher, he hires a team of psychologists to determine what makes Ann tick and a 
team of new-wave brainwashers to make Beth like Ann. […] Beth is now, in the relevant 
respects, a “psychological twin” of Ann. She is an industrious philosopher who enjoys 
and highly values her philosophical work. […] Her critical reflection, like Ann’s, fully 
supports her new style. 
(Mele 1995: 145) 
 
The intuition that we are supposed to have is that Beth is not autonomous, neither with respect to 
her critical reflection post-manipulation, nor with respect to the rededication inspired by that 
reflection. The task, now, is to identify the difference between Ann and Beth that explains why 
the former is autonomous but the latter is not.  
For proponents of structural accounts, there seems to be no satisfactory way to complete 
this task. Since Ann and Beth are “psychological twins” following Beth’s manipulation, it seems 
hopeless to look for a difference between them in their psychological or motivational structures. 
A structural approach to manipulation, then, isn’t likely to succeed. 
Historical accounts fare somewhat better. The dean, by his intervention, denied Beth the 
opportunity to deliberate or reflect on the change before he hired the team that instituted the 
change; indeed, her own deliberations pre-manipulation indicate that, given the choice, she 
would not accept the lifestyle that the dean wants her to have. In other words, the dean’s 
intervention prevented Beth from completing the appropriate historical process regarding her 
sudden lifestyle change, thereby undermining her autonomy with respect to having made that 
change. Historical accounts, then, can at least initially accommodate the intuition that Ann is 
autonomous while Beth is not. 
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But we can imagine a slightly different case wherein Beth was manipulated in a more 
distant manner. Perhaps the dean’s team rearranged Beth’s motivational structure such that she 
would make the change only after a year or so of critical reflection. In this case, one could argue 
that Beth completed the relevant historical process by, for instance, engaging with her new 
MPAs for a full year. Yet the intuition persists that she is not autonomous with respect to making 
the lifestyle change, even after a year of critical reflection.  
A historicist could reply that though Beth completed the right historical process, the 
impetus for completing that process came from a source external to Beth, rather than from Beth 
herself. That is, though Beth did engage with her MPAs in the right kind of way, the motivation 
for beginning the historical process in the first place came not from her, but from the dean and 
his team of scientists. And so, despite appearances, Beth is actually not autonomous.  
To press this reply, however, would have the unfortunate consequence of also 
disqualifying Ann as autonomous, since Ann’s own motivational structure also originated from 
external sources. After all, no one creates their MPAs entirely from scratch; Ann, like everyone 
else, is the result of the confluence of numerous influences during her formative years. And it is 
at best unclear why we should privilege Ann’s external influences over Beth’s.  
Active accounts, then, fail to successfully explain manipulation cases. Structural accounts 
fail to specify the relevant psychological difference between Ann and Beth, while historical 
accounts fail to do so isolate the relevant historical difference. Let us, then, move on to 
evaluation of Buss’s passive response to the case, and see if it fares any better. 
Some recent discussions of manipulation cases have focused, not on how manipulation 
prevents agents from sanctioning their actions, but rather on their problematic use of what can be 
13 
called effective background agency (EBA).3 EBA occurs when the manipulator not only wants 
the featured agent to do a certain thing, but is also able to ensure that the featured agent does that 
thing. The idea is that in cases involving EBA, the featured agent either (1) has her extant MPAs 
replaced by the ones the manipulator wants her to have, which then motivate the action that the 
manipulator wants her to perform; or (2) has new MPAs implanted in her which, while they 
don’t replace her own MPAs, nonetheless do all the work of motivating her to perform the 
relevant action. If (1) is true, then there is little sense in which the agent herself is in control over 
her behavior; she may not fail to sanction or endorse her actions, but she does fail to do so with 
respect to MPAs that are her own. If (2) is true, then though she retains her own set of MPAs, it 
isn’t those MPAs that motivate the relevant action. The motivational work is done entirely by the 
MPAs that the manipulator implanted. In cases involving EBA, then, with respect to the action 
that the manipulator wants the featured agent to perform, the agent’s motivational structure is 
either eliminated or bypassed entirely. 
Buss’s own response to manipulation cases builds upon this idea, offering an explanation 
as to why EBA reliably undermines autonomy. According to Buss, having a psychic identity, by 
which she means the set of “relatively stable psychological dispositions [which] are constituents 
of [one’s] identity” (687), is an essential component of what it means to function minimally well 
as a human being. Further, it is important that one’s psychic identity be allowed to exert causal 
influence on one’s actions, since “having no character, or personality, or psychic identity of any 
kind (or, what amounts to the same thing, no psychic identity that can directly influence the 
formation of [one’s] intentions) is incompatible with being a minimally well-functioning adult 
human being” (688).  
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Robyn Repko Waller, “The Threat of Effective Intentions to Moral Responsibility in the Zygote 
Argument,” Philosophia, Vol. 42 (2014): 209-222. See also Kristin Demetriou, “The Soft-Line Solution to 
Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88 (2010): 595-617. 
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If Buss is right about this, then the HFC helps to explain cases like Ann/Beth in a way 
that is importantly different from similar attempts by active accounts. The dean, simply by 
intervening in the production of Beth’s actions, prevents her from performing those actions 
autonomously. But this is not because Beth was prevented from reflecting fully enough or in the 
right kind of way about her actions, nor is it because she failed to take the right sanctioning 
attitudes toward her actions. Rather, Beth fails to be autonomous because the dean, by disrupting 
Beth’s psychic identity, prevented her from functioning minimally well as a human being. And, 
presumably, all EBA-style manipulations prevent agents from acting autonomously in just this 
way. 
What, then, should we say about those that don’t involve EBA? We can imagine for 
example that Beth’s manipulators, rather than instituting a change in her motivational structure 
that would guarantee her rededication, instead made her rededication only more likely. Perhaps 
they could accomplish this by somehow allowing Beth’s own MPAs to interact with the 
implanted ones in a way that leaves it open whether Beth will actually make the change they 
want her to make. Buss has the following to say about this kind of case: 
On my account, agents act autonomously as long as their intentions reflect the decisive 
influence of their character or personality; and this is true no matter how they acquired 
these psychological traits. When someone is moved by a desire that has just been forced 
upon her in the manner envisioned in the thought experiments, she does not act 
autonomously (since, again – at least if one is older than a toddler – having no 
functioning stable psychological traits is not a way of functioning-minimally well as a 
human being). As time goes by, however (and it may not be much time at all), a person 
who has been manipulated in this way may come to have a new identity. And as soon as 
this happens, the mad scientist’s prior intervention cannot prevent her from governing 
herself. […] What matters is whether the [manipulation] left her in a condition that 
impedes her ability to function minimally well as a human being. 
(Buss 2012: 688-689) 
 
This strikes me as the right response. That is, I see no conclusive reason that Beth, even if she is 
not autonomous immediately following the manipulation, could never become autonomous 
again. It seems plausible to me that there is some mechanism or process that allows for people to 
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“recover” from undue influences on their motivational structures. If not, we would have to say 
that people who have had troubling or overbearing childhoods are, for that reason, prevented 
henceforth from being autonomous. Of course, in extreme cases, they might actually be 
permanently unable to become autonomous. But I don’t see why this should be true necessarily 
or in every case.  
Buss, however, offers little guidance as to what such a mechanism or process might 
consist in or entail. Of course, since she is merely trying to establish a conceptual link between 
autonomy and human flourishing, perhaps she needn’t provide such an explanation in detail. I 
think, however, that such an explanation would help to bolster her account for two main reasons. 
First, and most obviously, such an explanation would complete her response to manipulation 
cases by helping to make sense of the reasonable intuition that Beth could overcome the 
influence of a non-EBA-style manipulation, and thereby strengthen her account overall. Second, 
such an explanation would also help us to make sense of Ann who, again, like everyone else, was 
surely heavily influenced during childhood by her formative environment. Presumably, we want 
to be able to explain another reasonable intuition, which is that people are not necessarily 
doomed by their childhoods to lives of nonautonomous action simply by having been influenced 
in certain undesirable ways (and we also want to be able to explain why, in the extreme cases, 
agents could be prevented from ever being autonomous again). 
It is likely that Buss would again make use of the notion of psychic identity and its 
importance for human well-functioning. Indeed, it is the requirement that an autonomous agent 
have a non-tampered-with psychic identity that allows her to offer an explanation as to why 
manipulated agents are not autonomous. However, while I think that this is a good point to press, 
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I think that it requires some elaboration. More specifically, I think that Buss needs to be more 
precise in her definition of psychic identity. 
To see the problem more clearly, consider a case slightly different from Ann/Beth, in 
which Beth rededicates her life to philosophy not because she was covertly manipulated by the 
Dean, but instead because Ann visits her at home one night and convinces her that she is no 
longer realizing her full potential as a philosopher. At first, Beth disagrees with Ann’s reasoning; 
she is, after all, very satisfied with the balance that her current lifestyle affords. But suppose that 
after a relatively short period of deliberation – perhaps just one night, the same amount of time 
that it takes the Dean’s team of manipulators to do their work in Ann/Beth – Beth decides that 
Ann is right after all. Beth has had a change of heart.  
I take it that we should say that this version of Beth, the one that had the change of heart, 
is autonomous with respect to her rededication. And presumably this is because the relevant 
change to her MPAs occurred in a way that was more organic and ‘normal’ than covert 
psychological manipulation. But without a more precise conception of ‘psychic identity’, as well 
as of how it relates to (and is constitutive of) autonomy and human flourishing, it becomes 
difficult to differentiate between manipulated Beth and change of heart Beth. After all, in both 
cases, Beth’s rededication was inspired by another agent, and took place in roughly the same 
amount of time. What we need is a fuller account of what ‘psychic identity’ amounts to, as well 
as of the principled difference between those changes in psychic identity that undermine 
autonomy (e.g., covert manipulation) and those that do not (e.g., a change of heart inspired by a 
friendly intervention). 
In other words, an explanation of how autonomy might re-emerge after cases of 
manipulation (e.g., Beth), as well as of how it develops in ordinary cases (e.g., Ann), would help 
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Buss to better handle the incompleteness problem that I set out in the opening which, again, is 
the problem of having to describe just how it is possible for agents to act autonomously if not by 
recourse to agential sanction. To this end, I turn now to the task of evaluating one promising 
account of the development of autonomy, recently put forward by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan 
Cuypers (2007) and seeing how well it fits with Buss’s account.  
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4 The Development of Autonomy 
I’ve been assuming thus far that the intuition that Beth is not autonomous with respect to 
her rededication to philosophy is the right one to have. Michael McKenna (2004) has challenged 
this intuition by using a concept that we can call instant agency.4 Haji and Cuypers (hereafter 
H&C; 2007) offer their account of the development of autonomy as a response to McKenna’s 
challenge. 
To see how instant agency is supposed to challenge the aforementioned intuition, we can 
imagine that Beth, rather than living a normal life up until the point when she was made into 
Ann’s psychological twin, was instead created instantaneously by a powerful deity with a full 
suite of MPAs and memories that make her, essentially, Ann’s psychological twin. Furthermore, 
we can imagine that Beth comes into existence at precisely the time that Ann performs some 
action A on the basis of her MPAs, and that Beth, being Ann’s psychological twin, performs the 
same action at the same time and for the same reasons. 
McKenna goes on to argue that in this case, an agent like Instant Beth would be 
autonomous with respect to A if Ann would be. This is because Instant Beth would not be 
relevantly different from an agent created in the way envisioned in Mele’s (2006) Zygote 
Argument (i.e., the god intentionally designed the agent’s zygote in such a way that she would 
grow up to become an autonomous adult and perform some action A at a particular time), and 
also an intentionally designed agent would not be relevantly different from an agent, like Ann, 
who develops her autonomy in the normal way. Consequently, since the intentionally designed 
agent is autonomous (owing to her similarity to the normal agent), and since the instant agent is 
                                                 
4
 Another, more counterintuitive strategy is to simply bite the bullet and insist that Beth is autonomous despite the 
dean’s manipulation. For an excellent discussion of this sort of reply to manipulation arguments, see Michael 
McKenna, “A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 28 (2008): 142-159. 
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autonomous (owing to her similarity to the intentionally designed agent), then if the manipulated 
agent is relevantly similar to the instant agent, then the manipulated agent is also autonomous. 
McKenna then supposes that manipulated agents are indeed similar to instant agents. And if 
McKenna were right about this, then our initial intuition regarding Beth’s non-autonomy would 
turn out to be mistaken. 
I wish at present to avoid questions regarding whether intentionally designed agents are 
autonomous, as well as those regarding whether there are relevant differences between 
intentionally designed agents and instant agents. Here, however, I will focus instead on whether 
a manipulated agent like Beth is, as McKenna supposes, not relevantly different from an instant 
agent. It is important for our purposes that we be able to resist this supposition, since accepting it 
entails the failure of the account that I mean to use to bolster Buss’s account. To that end, I 
proceed now to a brief discussion of the details of H&C’s account, and of what that account has 
to say about the difference between manipulated agents and instant agents.  
4.1 A ‘Two-Stage’ Account of the Development of Autonomy 
In a discussion about the sense in which “self-creation” is possible for beings like us, Joel 
Feinberg writes: 
The extent of [a] child’s role in his own shaping is […] a process of continuous growth 
already begun at birth. From the very beginning that process is given its own distinctive 
slant by the influences of heredity and early environment. […] After that, the child can 
contribute towards the making of his own self and circumstances in ever increasing 
degrees. These contributions are significant even though the child is in large part 
(especially in the earliest years) the product of external influences over which he has no 
control, and his original motivational structure is something he just finds himself with, 
not something he consciously creates. […] At every subsequent stage the immature child 
plays a greater role in the creation of his own life, until at the arbitrarily fixed point of 
full maturity, he is at last fully in charge of himself, his more or less finished character 
the product of a complicated interaction of external influences and ever-increasing 
contributions from his own earlier self. At least that is how growth proceeds when 
parents and other authorities raise a child with a maximal regard for the autonomy of the 
adult he will one day be. […] 
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Perhaps we are all self-made in the way just described, except those who have been 
severely manipulated, indoctrinated, or coerced throughout childhood. But the self we 
have created in this way for ourselves will not be an authentic self unless the habit of 
critical self-revision was implanted in us early by parents, educators, or peers, and 
strengthened by our own constant exercise of it. 
(Feinberg 1986: 34-35) 
 
There are several key ideas in this passage that serve as the foundations upon which H&C build 
their account. The first of these ideas regards the “habit of critical self-revision.” It is important 
that autonomous agents have a relatively stable and coherent set of MPAs, as well as the ability 
to act in accordance with those MPAs. But it is perhaps just as important that autonomous agents 
have the ability to step back and evaluate those MPAs. That is, it is important that an 
autonomous agent be able to reflect on his own motivational structure and decide for himself 
which of its components he should accept and keep, which he should modify, which he should 
remove, and whether any new components need to be added.  
H&C capture this notion of critical self-revision with a concept that they call the 
evaluative scheme, which is composed of “[n]ormative standards the agent believes (though not 
necessarily consciously) ought to be invoked in assessing reasons for action, or beliefs about 
how the agent should go about making choices, […] the agent’s long-term ends or goals he 
deems worthwhile or valuable, […] deliberative principles the agent utilizes to arrive at practical 
judgments about what to do or how to act,” as well as the motivation to act on his accepted 
normative standards in pursuit of his accepted goals at least partly on the basis of his accepted 
deliberative and practical principles (350). It is an agent’s evaluative scheme that ensures a 
harmonious relationship among the agents MPAs, as well as between those MPAs and the 
decisions that the agent makes.  
Feinberg’s second major idea is that there are two distinct stages in the development of 
autonomy. During the first stage, the person’s ability to govern his behavior is unrefined and 
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necessarily relies on certain external influences, which play a crucial role in facilitating the 
transition to the second stage. Once the person reaches the second stage, we say that he has 
matured to the point the he can now rightly be said to be “in control of himself.” Moreover, 
many of the interferences that were necessary during the first stage are now strictly prohibited, as 
they would influence the agent’s behavior in a way that controverts his now well-established 
authority over himself. 
H&C adapt this idea by distinguishing between two kinds of evaluative scheme: initial 
evaluative schemes, which correspond to the first stage of development, and evolved evaluative 
schemes, which correspond to the second stage. The goal of development is to ensure a 
successful change from an initial scheme into an evolved scheme, by way of acceptable 
interferences during the initial stage of development. 
The third and final idea regards determining what exactly counts as an acceptable 
interference. According to H&C, the acceptability of any particular interference depends on 
which stage of development the interfered-with agent is in. During the initial stage, interferences 
are acceptable to the extent that they facilitate the transition of the agent into a psychologically 
healthy and autonomous human being. Interferences during the evolved stage, however, are 
acceptable only if they were initiated by the agent’s own evaluative scheme or, after the right 
kind of deliberative activity, deemed allowable by the agent’s own evaluative scheme.  
One important thing to note is that though agents in both stages can be autonomous, they 
cannot be autonomous in exactly the same sense. Agents in the initial stage of development act 
under the influence not only of their rudimentary motivational structures, but also of external 
forces that, if they are acceptable, promise to increase the agent’s autonomy or, at the very least, 
not do it damage. To be ‘autonomous’ during the initial stage, then, is to be something like 
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‘autonomous-insofar-as-future-autonomy-is-not-subverted’. This means that autonomy at this 
stage is possible only in a restricted and forward-looking sense. In the evolved stage, however, 
the assumption is that the agent governs himself in a fuller manner than does his initial-stage 
counterparts. ‘Autonomy’ in the evolved stage, then, is closer in meaning to ‘full autonomy’ or 
‘autonomy simpliciter’, unrestricted by forward-looking considerations. 
On H&C’s account, then, an autonomous agent is one who is either (1) in possession of 
an initial evaluative scheme and is being externally influenced, if at all, in ways that are 
acceptable in the sense described above; or (2) in possession of an evolved evaluative scheme 
that is the result of acceptable interferences upon the initial scheme. 
Such are the details of H&C’s account. But what does it have to say about the difference 
between manipulated agents and instant agents? Manipulated agents such as Beth act on the basis 
of an evolved scheme that is the direct result of an unacceptable interference. In Beth’s case, the 
dean, in acting as he did, bypassed Beth’s evaluative scheme and, thereby, her chance to 
deliberate at all about the ensuing change. 
Instant agents, on the other hand, have no such checkered past – indeed, they have no 
past at all. As such, it can hardly be said that they act on the basis of unacceptable influences on 
their earlier evaluative scheme. They simply come into existence with a full complement of 
MPAs and mature deliberative capacities, albeit without having spent any time actually 
exercising those capacities for the purpose of evaluating their motivational structure. 
Interestingly, this means that whereas a child might take years to get to the evolved stage (owing 
to their nascent psychological capacities), an instant agent may be able to make the transition in a 
matter of days or even hours. At any rate, we should say that instant agents, at the moment of 
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their creation, are in possession of an initial evaluative scheme and are at least possibly 
autonomous (again, in the restricted, forward-looking sense). 
H&C’s account, then, seems able to preserve the intuition that manipulated agents are not 
autonomous, and also to demonstrate along the way they are relevantly different from instant 
agents. Returning now to the main inquiry, my next task will be to highlight the various ways in 
which H&C’s account and Buss’s account are mutually supportive.  
4.2 Bringing Together Buss and Haji & Cuypers 
We’ve already seen why Buss would say that a manipulated agent like Beth is not 
autonomous: her already established psychic identity was disrupted by the Dean’s team of 
scientists, and she was thereby prevented from functioning minimally well as a human being. 
This response is compatible with H&C’s response which, as we’ve seen, is that Beth’s own 
evaluative scheme (analogous to Buss’s ‘psychic identity) was either bypassed or replaced 
altogether, making the resulting evaluative scheme a nonautonomous one. And, if H&C accept 
Buss’s HFC, then they could say that such bypassing or replacement undermines our autonomy 
precisely because it prevents us from functioning in the way that we need to in order to develop 
and maintain autonomy. 
Buss and H&C also have compatible appraisals of instant agents. H&C are prepared to 
allow that instant agents are autonomous, but only in the restricted, forward-looking sense (since, 
once created, they possess an initial evaluative scheme that isn’t obviously the product of 
unacceptable interference with an existing scheme). While Buss says nothing at all about instant 
agents, I believe a plausible case can be made on her behalf that would align with H&C’s 
verdict. 
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Recall that the HFC states that psycho-physiological conditions undermine an agent’s 
autonomy just in case they decisively influence the production of that agent’s behavior and are 
themselves causes or symptoms of human malfunctioning. As explained above, it is easy enough 
to see how a manipulation could fall into the category of such undermining influences. But could 
the same be said about the instantaneous creation that is the cause of an instant agent’s actions? 
It isn’t obvious that to me that it could. After all, in the case of an instant agent, there is no ‘self’ 
or MPAs that exist prior to the creation event that could have been affected in any way at all; 
there is no psychic identity that could have been disrupted. Indeed, one might wonder whether 
cases of instant agency could pass as manipulation cases at all. At any rate, on the basis of what 
has been said, it is unclear whether creation ex nihilo could be considered an undermining 
influence in the sense relevant to Buss’s account, or, if it could, whether it would be undermining 
in the same way that more paradigmatic forms of manipulation are. A response that Buss could 
make, then, is that instant agents are at least possibly autonomous not because it is so obvious 
that creation ex nihilo isn’t in any way contributory to human malfunctioning, but because it isn’t 
so obvious that it is. And this response would align well with what H&C have said on the matter. 
Buss’s HFC supplements H&C’s account in that it explains not only that certain kinds of 
interference are unacceptable, but also more precisely why they are so. What remains to be seen, 
however, is whether H&C’s account can, as I have suggested, complete Buss’s response to 
manipulation cases by helping to explain how it might be possible for manipulated agents to 
“recover” from their manipulations. If this sort of explanation is possible, the combination of 
Buss’s and H&C’s accounts allows for a more comprehensive treatment of manipulation and 
instant agency than either of the accounts seem to have been able to provide separately. And at 
that point, I will have accomplished the goal that I set out in the opening. 
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How, then, can manipulated agents become autonomous again? Consider that the kinds of 
cases that we are trying to explain – non-EBA manipulated Beth, unacceptable child rearing, etc. 
– are cases in which the nonautonomous agent is in possession of a nonautonomous evolved 
scheme. An answer to our question, then, will likely begin with what has already been said about 
how evolved schemes can be acceptably changed in the first place. As a brief reminder, evolved 
schemes can be acceptably changed so long as such changes occur under the supervision of the 
agent’s own evaluative scheme.  
Now, given that the manipulation cases currently under investigation are of the non-EBA 
variety, we can safely assume that at least some of the agent’s own MPAs will remain intact 
following the manipulation. Further, if the agent is to act autonomously again, then it will have 
to be under the influence of those MPAs. More specifically, it is those MPAs – those that are left 
unaffected by the manipulation – that will have to do the work of evaluating, revising, and 
otherwise interacting with the implanted MPAs. Otherwise, those new MPAs, as well as the 
actions they might produce, cannot be considered autonomous. 
One might now worry that we have simply reverted back to the active strategy that we’ve 
been arguing against all along. What has just been proposed is that these new MPAs can only be 
considered autonomous if they were in some sense legitimized or validated by the agent who 
now possesses them. But this seems dangerously close to accepting again the problematic slogan 
of active accounts, which is that autonomous actions require agential sanction. The objection, 
then, is that perhaps passive accounts are just more convoluted versions of active accounts. 
Remember that active accounts ground autonomy in certain kinds of actions (e.g., 
reflective endorsements). That is, on active accounts, certain kinds of actions confer autonomy 
while other kinds of actions do not. In this way, actions play a direct role in establishing an 
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agent’s autonomy. By contrast, passive accounts ground autonomy in some feature of the agent 
herself. On passive accounts, an agent’s actions are obviously important, but they play only an 
ancillary role. They can help to establish an agent’s autonomy only if that agent already satisfies 
the relevant passive requirement – which, in this case, is that they agent must be functioning 
minimally well as a human being. That is, if an agent’s actions are autonomous, it will not be 
because they are sanctioning actions, but rather because they express her nature as a human 
being that is functioning minimally well as such.  
Our objector might then reply that if this is what the passive strategy entails, then there is 
no reason why we couldn’t keep our active accounts intact and supplement them with the notion 
that agential sanction is important not as a sanctioning action, but because it is one way in which 
we express our identity as, say, rational beings of a certain sort, rather than as human beings.5 
This, however, would be an ineffective reply for a proponent of active accounts to make 
for at least two reasons. First, this reply concedes perhaps the main motivation for passive 
accounts, which is that active accounts provide a description of the requirements of autonomy 
that is at best incomplete and at worst incorrect. Second, it is unclear to me why we shouldn’t 
regard the suggested account – one that emphasizes our nature as rational beings – as a passive 
account itself. If we should regard it as such, then it would be simply one among perhaps many 
passive alternatives to Buss’s account, requiring its own motivations, supporting evidence, and 
solution to the incompleteness problem. And even if such an account could be filled out and 
adequately defended, it would not demonstrate that Buss’s account is wrong. Again, it would 
simply present another viable option. A proponent of the active account who presses this reply, 
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 Steven Weimer has argued in favor of a strategy very similar to this. See Steven Weimer, “Autonomy, Regress, 
and Manipulation,” Philosophia, DOI: 10.1007/s11406-014-9552-8 (2014): 1-28. 
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then, either admits that his active strategy is incomplete or mistaken, or switches to defending a 
passive account himself. 
Let us return now to the main inquiry. It seems that enough has been said to support the 
idea that becoming autonomous after manipulation is possible, as well as about what might be 
involved in that process. We might still wonder, though, about the manipulative techniques 
themselves, particularly about the strength or effectiveness of those techniques. It seems intuitive 
to say, for example, that a manipulation that targets 75% of an agent’s MPAs is, all else being 
held equal, stronger or more effective than one that targets only 50%. And so perhaps the 
strength of a manipulation is a quantitative notion, dependent upon how much of an agent’s 
motivational structure is affected. In contrast, it also seems intuitive to say that a manipulation 
that targets a small number of the agent’s deeply-held and widely influential MPAs (e.g., moral 
commitments or rules) would be more effective than one that targets even a large number of less 
fundamental MPAs (e.g., beliefs regarding the agent’s favorite football team). If so, then perhaps 
which particular MPAs are affected matters more for the effectiveness of a manipulative 
technique than does the ration of affected to non-affected MPAs. That is, perhaps there are 
qualitative differences among an agent’s MPAs that bear on the effectiveness of any particular 
manipulative technique that might target them.6 
What I’m driving at is that perhaps the effectiveness of any manipulative technique, or of 
any particular use of such a technique, can be defined as a complex interaction among the 
various changes made to the targeted agent’s motivational structure, and also that effectiveness 
in this sense could be quantified and given something like a ‘manipulative effectiveness’ (ME) 
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 Readers familiar with the free will debate will notice that this qualitative suggestion lines up with several 
prominent compatibilist theories of free action. For example, Alfred Mele has discussed the importance of what he 
calls “practically unsheddable values”; see his Autonomous Agents. Similarly, Susan Wolf has discussed the 
importance of the alignment between an agent’s behavior and her long-standing commitments; see Susan Wolf, 
Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford, 1990). 
28 
value. Maybe Ann/Beth-style global manipulation has an ME value of 100, while an unpleasant 
and overbearing childhood might have an ME value of 40. 
The implication of these musings is that a systematic way of talking about different 
manipulative techniques might enable us to, for instance, establish a threshold on the ME scale, 
such that agent’s manipulated by techniques that fall above the ME threshold cannot recover, but 
those manipulated by techniques that fall below the ME threshold could. If so, then questions 
about how and whether an agent can recover from being manipulated may be inseparable from 
questions about each particular manipulation and the manner in which it affects the targeted 
agent.  
On one final and interesting note, consider that in cases that would fall above the 
proposed ME threshold, it would be impossible for the featured agents to become autonomous 
again, but not because they were manipulated. Rather, it would be because their MPAs were 
compromised to such an extent that further attempts at becoming autonomous were precluded 
(owing to a severely disrupted psychic identity, or to an irreparably compromised evaluative 
scheme), which, in principle, could happen even if those agents were not manipulated. In cases 
that would fall below the proposed ME threshold, it would still be open to the agent to become 
autonomous again despite having been manipulated (given, of course, that enough of their MPAs 
are left over to facilitate the right kind of engagement with the implanted MPAs), meaning that 
the manipulation does not automatically preclude the eventual possibility of autonomy. In any 
case, it seems that there is nothing about manipulation as such that makes it especially 
threatening to personal autonomy. Manipulation represents just one of the many ways in which 
agents can fail to act autonomously. 
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Now, of course, is the wrong time to pursue these interesting topics in any more detail 
than we already have. In sum, then, I will say simply that based on what has been said, a 
plausible case can be built in favor of the idea that agents can, on some occasions, become 
autonomous again after being manipulated.  
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5 Conclusion: Toward a Flourishing Account of Autonomy 
At the outset, I defined active accounts as those that adhere to the activity principle, 
according to which an agent is autonomous with respect to a given action only if the agent has 
appropriately sanctioned that action. I then demonstrated that this adherence to the activity 
principle makes active accounts susceptible to the regress problem. Passive accounts avoid the 
regress problem by eschewing the activity principle, but face in its place what I called the 
incompleteness problem. I then presented one recently defended passive account – Buss’s 
account based on the human flourishing condition – and suggested that it could avoid the 
incompleteness problem, though only if supplemented by a satisfactory account of the 
development of autonomy. In a discussion focused on manipulation cases, I argued that the 
development account put forward by Haji and Cuypers supplements Buss’s account especially 
well. My conclusion is that the two accounts together provide for a comprehensive treatment of 
manipulation cases, and thereby helps Buss’s account to avoid incompleteness problem.  
Indeed, it seems that a conceptual link between autonomy and human flourishing can be 
defended, and that the theoretical groundwork for what could be called a flourishing account of 
autonomy has been laid. On such an account, minimal well-functioning is a necessary condition 
for the autonomy of human agents. While I haven’t offered a complete account of what minimal 
well-functioning consists in, we have seen that is will likely involve, at the very least, having a 
suitable psychic identity that comes about as the result of proper psychological development (or, 
perhaps, a psychic identity that doesn’t come about as the result of improper psychological 
development, as suggested by the case of instant agency). 
Of course, there is much that has been left unsaid. For example, one philosophical task 
that is still incomplete is that of filling out what exactly is meant by a term like ‘human 
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flourishing’, as well as what it means to ‘function minimally well as a human being’ in respects 
relevant to autonomy. Buss is largely agnostic about specific answers to these kinds of questions 
(aside from her discussion of ‘psychic identity’). The next step for a proponent of the flourishing 
account would be to engage in a thorough exploration of this topic, which might include 
empirical inquiries into the traits and characteristics of autonomous agents, as well as into what 
kinds of circumstances are conducive to producing such agents. 
Indeed, psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan have been working earnestly on 
this very topic for years, and have developed a view that they refer to as Self Determination 
Theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985). On this view, personal autonomy is vitally important for human 
psychological well-being, and can be importantly affected by the myriad influences and 
environments that we experience, especially as we develop from children into adults. Many of 
the studies that investigate Self Determination Theory support several of the ideas that have been 
discussed here, such as the importance of autonomy to psychological well-being (Ryan, Deci, 
Grolnick, & La Guardia, 2006), as well as that certain environments seem more conducive to 
fostering autonomy than others (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Psychological work of this sort leads me to 
believe that a flourishing account of autonomy would have considerable empirical support. The 
flourishing account has much to recommend itself and is worthy of further research along the 
lines just mentioned.   
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